756 


Nl  \\ 


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BANCROFT 
LIBRARY 

•o 

THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 


ISSUES  OF 
A  NEW  EPOCH 


CoaJ  Strike 
PaLiYajnai 
Philippines  and  Cuba 


BY 


Joseph  Buck li iv  .Bishop 

Anther  off  "  Our  Politic*!  Dr*m*,"   ••  Cheap  Money 
Experiments.**  Etc. 


Reprinted  from 

••The  Interr\a.tioi\a.l  Quarterly " 


NEW  YORK 
SCOTT-THAW    COMPANY 

542   Fifth    Avenue 
1904 


ISSUES  OF 
A  NEW  EPOCH 


The  Coal  Strike 

Panama 
Philippines  and  Cuba 


BY 


JOSEPH    BUCKLINi  BISHOP 

Author  of   "Our  Political  Drama,"   * '  Cheap^TPloney  Experiments,' 
Etc. 


Reprinted  from 

"  The  International  Quarterly" 


NEW   YORK 

SCOTT -THAW    COMPANY 

542  Fifth  Avenue 
1904 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

THE  COAL  STRIKE,        .    %    .        .       .        .      ..        .        .  .^  .      3 

PANAMA  REPUBLIC  AND  CANAL,          .        .        .        .        .  ,  .10 

Course  of  the  American  Government,     .        ...  .  .10 

Why  the  President  was  Prompt,     .        *        .        .       '.  .  .13 

Complicity  and  Treaty  Obligations,       .        .        .        .  .  .17 

Colombia's  Usurping  Government,     •''.  .       •.        .        i,  .  .     19 

OUR  WORK  AS  A  CIVILIZER,        »        .        .        .        .        •  .  .    23 

The  New  Republic  of  Cuba,           .        .        .        .        .  .  .24 

Peace  and  Progress  in  the  Philippines,  ....  .26 

The  Friars'  Lands,  29 


Copyright,  1903-1904,  by  F.  A.  RICHARDSON. 
Copyright,  1904,  by  JOSEPH  BUCKLIN  BISHOP. 


ISSUES   OF  A  NEW   EPOCH. 


THE    COAL   STRIKE. 

anthracite  coal  strike  which  Avas  ended  through  the  inter- 
vention of  the  President  in  October,  1903,  was  not  only  the 
most  serious  contest  of  the  kind  this  country  has  ever 
known,  but  the  most  serious  that  the  world  has  known.  Other 
strikes  have  involved  a  larger  number  of  men  and  have  entailed 
nearly  or  quite  as  much  financial  loss,  but  none  has  affected  the  peo- 
ple of  the  entire  country  to  anything  like  the  extent  which  this  one 
did,  simply  because  none  stopped  the  production  of  what  has 
come  to  be  regarded  as  a  necessity  of  life.  Of  course  anthracite 
is  not  an  absolute  necessity  of  life.  If  the  supply  were  to  be  ex- 
hausted this  year,  substitutes  for  it  as  fuel  would  be  found.  The 
world  would  have  to  learn  to  get  on  without  it;  but  so  long  as 
people  regard  it  as  a  necessity,  and  so  long  as  they  know  it  exists 
and  can  be  obtained,  they  will  not  submit  to  having  the  supply 
cut  off  without  protest,  more  or  less  violent,  according  to  their 
needs  and  sufferings.  That  virtually  all  the  people  did  believe 
in  October,  1903,  that  anthracite  was  a  necessity  both  to  their 
comfort  and  their  health,  is  not  to  be  questioned.  They  be- 
lieved it  so  implicitly  that  nothing  which  could  be  said  to  the 
contrary  had  any  appreciable  effect  upon  them.  Their  convic- 
tion was  so  strong  that  the  mere  threat  of  a  coal  famine  sent  a 
panicky  feeling  throughout  every  large  city  in  the  land.  In  the 
country  districts  a  sufficient  supply  of  wood  could  be  obtained, 
but  in  the  cities  there  was  little  or  no  hope  of  doing  so.  Bitu- 
minous coal  was  an  insufficient  substitute  because  nearly  all 
existing  heating  apparatus  was  not  adapted  to  its  use.  Without 
anthracite,  every  household  in  a  large  city  was  threatened  with 
discomfort  and  peril.  It  came  about,  therefore,  that  the  whole 
population  had  an  intense  personal  interest  in  the  strike  based 
upon  two  very  strong  reasons — first,  danger  to  their  individual 

3 


THE    COAL   STRIKE. 


well-being ;  and,  second,  a  heavy  tax  upon  their  resources  to  meet 
the  higher  cost  of  fuel  of  any  kind. 

As  weeks  and  months  went  by  with  one  promise  of  settle- 
ment after  another  proving  a  delusion,  and  with  cold  weather  at 
hand,  this  panicky  feeling  increased  until  it  became  a  menace  to 
the  public  safety.  For  five  months  the  mines  had  been  idle,  and 
while  the  coal  operators  declared  that  there  was  no  danger  of  a 
coal  famine,  it  was  within  the  knowledge  of  every  householder 
that  the  famine  was  already  in  sight.  It  was  only  with  extreme 
difficulty  that  a  single  ton  of  coal  could  be  obtained  in  New  York 
and  other  large  cities  by  a  small  consumer,  and  every  householder 
who  had  neglected  to  put  in  his  winter's  supply  in  the  spring 
found  it  impossible  to  obtain  it  except  in  small  quantities  and  at 
steadily  rising  prices.  Many  dealers  refused  to  take  orders  and 
most  of  them  were  entirely  without  a  supply.  In  the  presence 
of  a  condition  like  this  it  was  worse  than  foolish  for  the  mine 
owners  to  persist  in  their  statement,  as  they  did  daily,  that  there 
was  no  scarcity,  for  their  denial  of  what  everybody  knew  to  be 
the  actual  fact  served  to  arouse  popular  distrust  of  them  and  to 
aggravate  rather  than  to  quiet  the  general  uneasiness.  It  was 
almost  maddening  to  tell  thousands  of  people  who  had  been  try- 
ing in  vain  for  days  and  weeks  to  get  coal  that  there  was  plenty 
of  coal  to  be  had  and  they  were  foolish  to  think  there  was  not. 

When  all  efforts  to  bring  about  a  settlement  had  failed,  when 
the  state  of  Pennsylvania  had  shown  itself  powerless  to  even 
maintain  order  in  the  coal  region,  it  was  natural  for  the  people 
of  the  country  to  turn  to  the  Federal  government  for  aid.  This 
they  began  to  do  early  in  October,  when  the  approach  of  cold 
weather  sent  a  thrill  of  alarm  throughout  the  land.  Appeals  to 
President  Koosevelt  began  to  pour  in  from  all  quarters,  both 
from  individuals  and  from  persons  in  authority.  Governor  Crane 
of  Massachusetts,  Mayor  Low  of  New  York  City,  and  the  heads 
of  municipal  governments  generally  besought  the  President  to 
use  his  good  offices  in  some  way  to  bring  about  an  adjustment  in 
order  that  the  imminent  peril  of  suffering  and  riot  might  be 
warded  from  the  land.  The  President  could  not  be  deaf  to  such 
appeals.  No  president  that  the  country  has  ever  had  could  have 
been,  for  not  only  the  comfort  and  lives  of  countless  numbers  of 
people  were  threatened,  but  stability  and  lawful  government,  and 
millions  in  property  were  at  stake  in  every  city  of  the  land.  The 
President  had  no  authority  in  law  and  no  precedent  to  sustain 
him.  He  was  fully  aware  of  this  and  he  succeeded  by  never  los- 
ing sight  of  the  fact  that  he  had  neither.  No  task  that  he  had 


THE   COAL  STRIKE. 


undertaken  previously  had  involved  so  large  an  element  of  polit- 
ical risk  as  this  did.  It  was  an  entirely  new  departure.  Noth- 
ing like  it  had  ever  been  done  by  a  president.  The  great  body 
of  conservative  opinion  in  the  country  had  serious  doubts  about 
either  the  wisdom  or  the  justification  of  the  step.  He  felt  moved 
to  act  because  of  the  great  public  need  and  great  public  perij.  in- 
volved, and  he  could  not  escape  the  conviction  that  it  was  a  mat^ 
ter  of  simple  duty  for  him,  as  the  people's  president,  to  exert 
all  the  moral  influence  he  had  in  the  interest  of  the  people. 
Criticism  did  not  affect  him  at  all,  no  matter  what  its  source, 
once  he  had  made  up  his  mind.  He  dini  not  count  the  chances 
of  success  or  failure,  and  when  he  was  told,  as  he  was  repeatedly, 
that  failure  would  ruin  him  politically,  he  went  steadily  and  fear- 
lessly ahead.  While  both  sides  to  the  quarrel  repulsed  his  first 
efforts  and  refused  to  step  up  to  the  high  ground  of  public  wel- 
fare upon  which  he  stood  and  to  which  he  invited  them,  he  per- 
severed in  his  appeals  to  them  till  both  came  in  the  end,  if  not 
willingly,  at  least  with  recognition  of  the  fact  that  he  had  offered 
to  them  a  way  out  without  surrender.  He  succeeded  in  this,  as 
lie  succeeded  in  all  other  lijte  endeavors,  by  being  open  and 
straightforward  in  all  his  proceedings.  He  had  no  hidden  end 
to  serve ;  lie  leaned  neither  to  one  side  nor  to  the  other,  but  said 
siinpty,  "  I  offer  you  my  services  as  mediator  in  order  that  this 
contest  which  so  seriously  threatens  the  welfare  and  the  peace 
of  the  whole  country  may  be  brought  to  an  end."  His  obvious 
sincerity  and  singleness  of  purpose  so  impressed  the  whole  coun- 
try and,  indeed,  the  whole  world,  that  the  contending  forces 
were  fairly  compelled  to  yield  to  his  proposals.  The  chorus  of 
praise  which  arose  from  all  quarters  of  the  land,  and  from  all 
the  leading  countries  of  Europe,  when  success  was  recorded,  was 
something  that  no  other  president  had  received.  He  himself 
was  unable  to  comprehend  it  and  thought  it  undeserved.  When 
it  was  spoken  of  in  his  presence,  he  said  to  his  intimate  friends, 
"  I  am  being  very  aiuch  over-praised  by  everybody.  I  do  not 
deserve  it.  It  really  seems  to  jae  that  any  man  of  average  cour- 
age and  common  sense,  who  felt  as  deeply  as  I  did  the  terrible 
calamity  impending  over  our  people,  would  have  done  just  what 
I  did." 

He  was  not  the  only  }>erson  in  the  land  wh/o  felt  the  gravity 
of  the  situation.  It  has  been  charged  and  is  still  charged  by  his 
critics  that  he  did  what  jao  other  presideait  befoi^  him  had  done 
and  what  few  of  them  would  have  consented  to  do.  It  is  no  longer 
a  secret  that  in  all  that  he  did  he  had  the  hearty  approval  and 


THE    COAL   STRIKE. 


sympathy  of  ex-President  Cleveland.  Early  in  his  efforts  to 
bring  about  peace  between  the  mine  operators  and  the  miners, 
Mr.  Cleveland  took  occasion  to  express  his  complete  accord  with 
him.  On  the  day  following  the  first  meeting  before  the  Presi- 
dent, at  Washington,  of  the  operators  and  representatives  of  the 
strikers,  which  failed  because  of  the  refusal  of  the  operators  to 
consent  to  a  commission  of  arbitration,  Mr.  Cleveland  wrote  to 
the  President  a  letter  which  in  addition  to  expressing  approval 
of  the  President's  course,  and  some  righteous  indignation  at  the 
obstinacy  of  the  contestants,  contained  suggestions  for  a  plan  of 
settlement,  and  gave  as  a  reason  for  volunteering  his  views  that 
his  doing  so  would  at  least  "serve  as  an  indication  of  the  anxiety 
felt  by  millions  of  our  citizens  on  the  subject."  The  only  living 
ex-President,  and  the  only  Democratic  President  that  the  coun- 
try has  had  since  the  civil  war,  thus  joined  hands  with  the  Re- 
publican President  in  believing  that  a  crisis  had  arisen  which 
was  so  grave  as  to  justify  extraordinary  action  by  the  Executive 
of  the  nation.  It  is  also  no  longer  a  secret,  that  after  receiving 
this  letter  from  Mr.  Cleveland,  President  Roosevelt  asked  him  if 
he  would  consent  to  be  a  member  of  a  commission  of  settle- 
ment and  that  Mr.  Cleveland  replied  in  the  affirmative.  This 
acceptance  persuaded  the  President  to  appoint  a  commission  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  operators,  in  case  they  continued  in  their 
refusal  to  give  it,  and  he  proceeded  to  choose  the  members  of  it, 
with  Mr.  Cleveland  as  the  first.  The  men  whom  he  selected 
were  mainly  those  subsequently  appointed,  but  when  the  opera- 
tors and  their  financial  associates  heard  of  the  President's  pur- 
pose and  heard  also  of  Mr.  Cleveland's  selection  as  member  of 
the  commission,  they  made  haste  to  give  their  consent  to  the  plan 
of  arbitration,  but  protested  vigorously  against  the  selection  of 
Mr.  Cleveland.  They  realized  keenly  enough  what  the  moral 
effect  would  be  upon  the  country  of  having  it  appear  that  the 
only  living  ex-President,  who  was  also  the  most  eminent  Demo- 
crat in  the  land,  stood  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  President 
Roosevelt  in  what  he  had  done  and  proposed  to  do.  That  would 
have  ended  the  "Constitutional"  objection  to  Roosevelt's  course 
at  once  and  forever. 

But  if  the  operators  would  not  permit  Mr.  Cleveland  to 
serve  on  the  commission,  they  did  allow  the  President  to  appoint 
to  it  a  Democrat  who  indisputably  ranks  next  to  Mr.  Cleveland  in 
ability  and  character,  and  in  reputation  for  sound  Constitutional 
construction,  when  they  consented  to  the  choice  of  Judge  George 
Gray  of  Delaware.  His  approval  of  the  President's  course,  ex- 


THE    COAL   STKIKE. 


pressed  after  he  had  conducted  the  inquiry  to  a  successful  con- 
clusion, should  be  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  criticisms  which  are 
made  of  the  President's  course.  In  an  interview  which  was  pub- 
lished in  the  New  York  "World,"  on  September  1,  1903,  Judge 
Gray  said : 

"  I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  the  President  of  the  United  States 
was  confronted  in  October,  1902,  by  the  existence  of  a  crisis  more  grave 
and  threatening  than  any  that  had  occurred  since  the  civil  war.  I  mean 
that  the  cessation  of  mining  in  the  anthracite  country,  brought  about  by 
the  dispute  between  the  miners  and  those  who  controlled  the  greatest  nat- 
ural monopoly  in  this  country  and  perhaps  in  the  world,  had  brought  upon 
more  than  one-half  of  the  American  people  a  condition  of  deprivation  of 
one  of  the  necessaries  of  life,  and  the  probable  continuance  of  the  dispute 
threatened  not  only  the  comfort  and  health,  but  the  safety  and  good  order, 
of  the  nation.  He  was  without  legal  or  constitutional  power  to  interfere, 
but  his  position  as  President  of  the  United  States  gave  him  an  influence,  a 
leadership,  as  first  citizen  of  the  republic,  that  enabled  him  to  appeal  to 
the  patriotism  and  good  sense  of  the  parties  to  the  controversy  and  to  place 
upon  them  the  moral  coercion  of  public  opinion  to  agree  to  an  arbitrament 
of  the  strike  then  existing  and  threatening  consequences  so  direful  to  the 
whole  country.  He  acted  promptly  and  courageously,  and  in  so  doing 
averted  the  dangers  to  which  I  have  alluded. 

"So  far  from  interfering  or  infringing  upon  property  rights,  the  Presi- 
dent's action  tended  to  conserve  them.  The  peculiar  situation,  as  regards 
the  anthracite  coal  interest,  was  that  they  controlled  a  natural  monopoly 
of  a  product  necessary  to  the  comfort  and  to  the  very  life  of  a  large  por- 
tion of  the  people.  A  prolonged  deprivation  of  the  enjoyment  of  this 
necessary  of  life  would  have  tended  to  precipitate  an  attack  upon  these 
property  rights  of  which  you  speak :  for,  after  all,  it  is  vain  to  deny  that 
this  property,  so  peculiar  in  its  conditions,  and  which  is  properly  spoken 
of  as  a  natural  monopoly,  is  affected  with  a  public  interest. 

"I  do  not  think  that  any  president  ever  acted  more  wisely,  coura- 
geously, or  promptly  in  a  national  crisis.  Mr.  Roosevelt  deserves  unstinted 
praise  for  what  he  did." 

It  has  always  been  contended  by  the  President's  critics  that 
if  he  had  not  intervened  the  strikers  would  have  surrendered  in 
a  very  short  time.  Those  who  make  this  assertion  overlook,  in 
the  first  place,  the  fact  that  the  operators  had  been  for  fully  two 
months  predicting  daily  the  end  of  the  strike.  They  overlook, 
in  the  second  place,  the  fact  that  under  the  Pennsylvania  law 
the  entire  body  of  available  mine  workers  was  with  the  strikers. 

It  was  claimed  by  the  mine  operators  that  only  about  one- 
half  of  the  laborers  in  the  coal  region  were  members  of  the 
organization  which,  under  Mr.  Mitchell's  leadership,  ordered  the 
strike ;  that  the  other  half  were  either  members  of  local  unions 
or  non-union  men.  The  highest  estimate  which  the  operators 
made  of  the  number  of  persons  whom  they  were  able  to  .induce 


8  THE    COAL   STRIKE. 


to  work  while  the  strike  was  in  progress  was  17,000.  Under  the 
Pennsylvania  law,  no  person  can  be  employed  as  a  miner  in  the 
anthracite  mines  until  he  has  passed  an  examination  by  a  state 
board  created  for  the  purpose  and  has  received  a  certificate  or 
license.  One  of  the  conditions  of  such  license  is  "  not  less  than 
two  years'  practical  experience  as  a  mine  laborer  "  in  the  anthra- 
cite fields.  It  was  this  requirement  which  most  seriously  ham- 
pered the  operators  in  their  efforts  to  work  the  mines  without 
the  aid  of  the  strikers,  for  men  brought  from  other  sections  could 
be  employed  only  in  violation  of  the  law.  The  strikers  claimed 
that  they  controlled  ninety-five  per  cent,  of  all  the  licensed 
workers,  and  this  was  probably  true.  While  the  commission 
was  in  session  I  asked  one  of  the  regular  counsel  of  the  opera- 
tors if  it  was  not  true  that,  if  the  operators  had  been  given  ample 
military  protection  to  prevent  all  intimidation  and  violence  on 
the  part  of  the  strikers  toward  the  non-union  men  who  were  will- 
ing to  work,  they  would  stilt  have  been  unable,  because  of  the 
license  law,  to  obtain  a  force  of  miners  sufficient  to  produce  a 
snpply  of  coal  anything  like  adequate  to  the  winter's  demands. 
Me  replied  that  it  was  true.  That  was  an  admission  that  Mitchell 
was  master  of  the  situation  and  that  unless  the  President  had 
intervened  there  would  have  been,  if  not  a  famine  of  coal,  a  scar- 
city so  serious  as  to  cause  suffering  and  probable  riots  in  the 
large  cities. 

One  of  the- most  interesting  aspects  of  the  President's  com- 
mission for  final  adjudication  of  the  questions  at  issue  between 
the  operators  and  their  employees  was  the  principle  of  arbitra- 
tion embodied;  in  it.  This  was  a  very  different  principle  from 
the  one  insisted  upon  by  Mr.  Mitchell  at  the  outset  of  tire  strug- 
gle. It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Civic  Federation,  under 
the  leadership  of  S-enator  Hanna,  ntade  an  earnest  and  prolonged 
effort  to  settle  the  strike  wlrew  it  was  first  threatened  in  April. 
A  conference  between  the  conflicting  parties  was  heM,  and  al- 
though an  armistice  of  thirty  days  was  secured,  failure  ensued 
because  the  operators  refused  to  recognize  the  union  by  consent- 
ing to  an  arbitration  with  it.  In  an  arbitration  of  that  kind  the 
claims  of  non-union  men  would  have  no  standing  whatever,  for 
thete  would  simply  be  two  parties  to  it,  the  operators  and  the 
union.  Under  the  President's  plan,  the  commission  was  to  con- 
sider ""all  questions  at  issue  between  the  respective  companies 
arrcf  their  employees,"  and  it  was  especially  stipulated  that  pend- 
ing its  findin-gs  all  miners  should  return  to  work  and  all  interfer- 
ence with  and  persecution  of  non-union  men  at  present  working 


THE    COAL   STRIKE. 


or  hereafter  employed  should  cease.  It  was  also  stipulated,  and 
the  stipulation  was  accepted  by  both  parties,  that  when  the  com- 
mission should  have  reached  its  finding  these  "  shall  govern  the 
conditions  of  employment  between  the  respective  companies  and 
their  employees  for  a  term  of  at  least  three  years." 

The  selections  which  the  President  made  for  members  of  the 
commission  were  in  accordance  with  .the  spirit  of  his  appeal. 
He  chose  them  with  the  single  object  in  view  of  getting  a  deci- 
sion in  accordance  with  right  and  justice.  It  was  the  unanimous 
opinion  of  the  country  that  a  more  competent  or  more  impartial 
tribunal  could  not  have  been  constituted.  It  was  in  every  way 
superior  to  the  Civic  Federation  as  an  arbitrating  body,  for  it 
contained  no  member  who  was  identified  directly  with  either 
party  to  the  controversy.  The  Civic  Federation  was,  further- 
more, a  self-constituted  body  and  could  only  offer  its  services  in 
labor  controversies.  It  was  not  asked  to  arbitrate  the  coal  strike, 
and  it  could  not  get  the  consent  of  the  operators  to  such  arbitra- 
tion. The  President's  commission  entered  upon  its  duties  under 
the  high  moral  authority,  if  no  other,  of  the  highest  officer  in  the 
land, and  with  the  consent  of  both  the  contestants  and  their  promise 
to  accept  its  decrees.  It  sat  for  nearly  five  months,  taking  a  great 
mass  of  testimony  and  agreeing  unanimously  upon  a  report  that 
was  a  compromise,  in  which  the  strikers  secured  about  half  their 
demands,  while  failing  to  get  a  hearing  upon  their  main  conten- 
tion, which  was  the  recognition  of  their  union  by  the  mine  opera- 
tors. The  use  of  intimidation  and  violence  in  support  of  the 
strike  was  strongly  condemned,  and  for  the  settlement  of  future 
disputes  a  board  of  conciliation  was  proposed,  to  be  made  up  of 
three  members  from  each  side,  who  could  appeal  to  the  circuit 
judge  of  the  district  to  appoint  an  umpire  whose  decision  should 
be  final.  The  report  was  generally  regarded  as  equable,  and 
both  sides  accepted  it  as  they  had  pledged  themselves  in  advance 
to  do.  Since  the  verdict  was  rendered  there  has  been  peace  in 
the  coal  region.  From  tune  to  time  minor  disputes  have  arisen 
but  they  have  been  settled  easily  under  the  terms  of  the  agree- 
ment. The  great  results  of  the  President's  course  were,  there- 
fore, an  immediate  resumption  of  mining,  which  supplied  the 
country  with  coal  and  thus  warded  off  suffering  and  disorder, 
and  the  establishment  of  peace  in  the  region  for  three  years. 
The  indirect  but  scarcely  less  beneficent  result  was  the  beginning 
of  a  better  understanding  between  operators  and  miners  which 
every  day  of  pe^ce  is  developing  and  strengthening. 


PANAMA   REPUBLIC   AND   CANAL. 

COURSE   OF   THE  AMERICAN   GOVERNMENT. 

THE  future  historian,  when  he  sits  down  to  write  the  nar- 
rative of  the  establishment  of  the  republic  of  Panama, 
will  treat  it  as  the  culminating  step  in  a  movement  that 
had  been  in  progress  for  more  than  four  hundred  years.  Viewed 
in  that  perspective,  it  is  likely  to  appear  a  far  less  hasty  pro- 
ceeding than  it  seemed  to  be  at  the  time  it  was  effected.  The 
final  step  was  swift  only  when  contemplated  by  itself.  Consid- 
ered in  connection  with  the  long  and  wearisome  and  annoying 
journey  which  had  preceded  it,  the  wonder  is  not  that  'A,  was 
taken  so  quickly,  but  that  human  patience  had  delayed  so  long 
before  taking  it. 

I  shall  endeavor,  in  making  a  record  of  it,  to  treat  it  as  com- 
pletely as  possible  in  the  light  of  history,  for  it  has  become  his- 
torical fact.  The  new  republic  is  established  with  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  United  States  and  all  the  leading  nations  of  the 
world,  and  the  treaty  by  which  the  United  States  guarantees 
and  pledges  itself  to  maintain  the  independence  of  the  republic 
of  Panama  was  ratified  in  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  sixty-six  to 
fourteen,  so  many  Democrats  voting  for  it  as  to  make  approval 
of  the  Roosevelt  administration's  course  virtually  non-partisan, 
and  hence  popular.  Instead  of  arguing  the  case  for  the  govern- 
ment, I  shall  content  myself  with  a  statement  of  its  reasons  for 
the  action  which  it  took,  citing  these  as  its  answer  to  the  main 
points  of  the  criticism  which  has  been  made  against  its  course. 

Did  the  Roosevelt  administration  act  too  quickly  in  recog- 
nizing the  new  republic? 

In  considering  this  question,  both  the  President  and  the  Sec- 
retary of  State,  according  to  their  official  explanations  of  their 
course,  recalled  the  long  history  of  the  efforts  of  the  American 
government  to  pierce  the  Isthmus  with  a  canal.  As  early  as 
1528  a  proposal  was  laid  before  the  Emperor  Charles  V.  for  the 
opening  of  such  a  way  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  From 
that  day  till  1904  the  project  continued  to  occupy  a  place  among 

10 


PANAMA  KEPUBLIC  AND  CANAL,      11 

the  great  enterprises  yet  to  be  accomplished.  It  remained  unful- 
filled only  because  the  experience  of  four  hundred  years  had 
demonstrated  that  private  effort  was  wholly  inadequate  to  the 
purpose,  and  that  the  work  must  be  performed,  if  at  all,  under 
the  auspices  of  a  government  of  the  largest  resources.  There 
was  only  one  such  government  in  a  position  to  undertake  it.  By 
a  well  settled  policy,  in  which  all  American  nations  are  under- 
stood to  concur,  the  assumption  of  the  task  by  any  of  the  great 
governments  of  Europe  was  pronounced  to  be  inadmissible. 
Among  American  governments  there  was  only  one  that  seemed  to 
be  able  to  assume  the  burden  and  that  was  the  government  of 
the  United  States.  To  the  accomplishment  of  this  object  that 
government  had  for  years  directed  its  diplomacy.  It  occupied 
a  place  in  the  instructions  to  our  delegates  to  the  Panama  Con- 
gress during  the  administration  of  John  Quincy  Adams.  It 
formed  the  subject  of  a  resolution  of  the  Senate  in  1835,  and  of 
the  House  of  ^Representatives  in  1839.  In  1846  its  importance 
had  become  still  more  apparent  by  reason  of  the  Mexican  War,, 
when  a  treaty  was  made  with  New  Granada  in  regard  to  it. 
Four  years  later  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  was  entered  into  be- 
tween this  country  and  Great  Britain.  That  treaty  instead  of 
furthering  the  project  proved  to  be  an  insuperable  bar  to  it.. 
During  the  fifty-one  years  of  its  existence,  nothing  was  done 
toward  the  construction  of  a  canal.  It  became,  almost  immedi- 
ately after  ratification,  the  subject  of  bitter  attack  in  this  coun- 
try because  of  its  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  in  allowing 
England  and  other  European  nations  to  share  with  us  control  of 
a  canal,  and  because  of  England's  alleged  failure  to  comply  with 
its  conditions.  From  time  to  time,  efforts  were  made  to  have 
the  treaty  denounced,  or  declared  by  us  void  because  of  Eng- 
land's failure  to  comply  with  its  requirements,  but  the  American 
government  refused  steadily  to  take  this  view,  holding  that  we 
were  bound  in  honor  to  abide  by  the  treaty  till  England  should 
consent  to  its  abrogation.  That  consent  was  given,  and  in  De- 
cember, 1901,  a  new  treaty  was  agreed  upon,  the  main  point  of 
which  is  the  complete  withdrawal  of  Great  Britain  from  part- 
nership with  the  United  States  in  the  control  of  any  canal  that 
may  be  constructed.  It  was  to  be  built  with  American  money, 
and  controlled  by  Americans,  and  its  neutrality  maintained  by 
Americans.  The  United  States  secured  power  "  to  maintain  such 
military  police  along  the  canal  as  may  be  necessary  to  protect  it 
against  lawlessness  and  disorder,"  but  beyond  that  no  express 
power  is  given  to  fortify  it,  while  the  language  of  the  treaty 


12  -  FAHAlrU  REPUBLIC   AND   CANAL. 

seems  to  amount  to  a  prohibition  in  that  direction.  "  The  canal," 
it  reads,  "  shall  be  free  and  open  to  the  vessels  of  commerce  and 
of  war  of  all  nations  observing  the  rules  prescribed  for  the  pres- 
ervation of  its  neutrality,,  and  shall  never  be  blocked,  nor  shall 
any  night  of  war  be  exercised,  nor  any  act  of  hostility  be  com- 
mitted within  it." 

The  way  now  seemed  clear  for  the  construction  of  the  canal. 
On  January  22,  1902,  the  second  Pan-American  Conference,  sit- 
ting at  the  City  of  Mexico,  adopted  the  following  resolution  : — 

"The  Republics  assembled  at  the  International  Conference  of  Mexico 
applaud  the  purpose  of  the  United  States  government  to  construct  an 
inteivoceanic  canal,  and  acknowledge  that  this  work  will  not  only  be 
w.orthy  of  the  greatness  of  the  American  people,  but  also  in  the  highest 
sense  a, work  of- civilization  and  to  the  greatest  degree  beneficial  to  the  de- 
velopment of  commerce  between  the  American  States  and  the  other  coun- 
tries of  the  world." 

Among  the  delegates  who  signed-  this  resolution,  which  was 
adopted  without  dissent,  was  the  delegate  of  Colombia.  The 
next  step  was  the  decision  of  the  United  States  in  favor  of  the 
Panama  route  in  preference  to  that  of  Nicaragua,  and  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Spooner  Act  in  June,  1902j  authorizing  the  President 
to  acquire  at  a  cost  not  exceeding  forty  million  dollars  the  prop- 
erty and  concession  of  the  Panama  Canal  Company  and  to  ob" 
tain  from  Colombia,  on.  such  terms  as  he  deemed  reasonable, 
control. of  the  territory  necessary  for  the  canal.  Therefore,  nego- 
tiations were  opened,  with  Colombia,  and  in  January,  1903,  the 
Hay-Herran  Treaty  was  agreed  upon*  This  was  ratified  by  the 
Senate  and  was  sent  to  Colombia  for  approval  by  its  government. 
While  the  treaty  was  in  negotiation  between  the  representatives 
of,  the  United  States  and  Colombia,  objection  was  made  by  the 
Colombian  government  through  its  representatives  to  the  first 
article,  which  provided :  "  The  government  of  Colombia  author- 
izes the  new  Panama  Canal  Company  to  sell  and  transfer  to  the 
United  States  its  rights,  privileges,  properties,  and  concessions, 
as  well  as  the  Panama  railroad  and  all  the  shares  or  part  of  the 
shares  of  that  company. "  The  Colombian  government  asked  to 
have  this  modified  so  as  to  read  that  the  permission  accorded 
by  Colombia  in  regard  to  canal  and  railway  rights  should  "be* 
regulated  by  previous  special  arrangement  entered  into  by  Colom- 
bia." This  request  the  American  government  refused  to  grant, 
and  it  was  abandoned  by  Colombia,  whose  representatives  signed 
the  treaty  with  the  full  authorization  as  it  stands  in  the  article, 
which,  is  identical  with  that  in  the  original  draft  of 'a 'treaty  pre- 


PANAMA   EEPUBLIC   AND   CANAL.  13 

sented  by  Colombia  itself  through  its  minister  to  the  American 
government  in  March,  1902.  Some  time  after  the  treaty  had 
been  signed,  the  American  government  was  surprised  to  learn 
that  the  Colombian  government,  in  violation  of  this  article,  had 
sent  notices  to  the  canal  company  saying  that  further  permission, 
in  addition  to  that  contained  in  the  treaty,  was  necessary  for  the 
transfer  of  its  concession  and  those  of  the  railway  company  to 
the  United  States,  and  requiring  the  companies  to  cancel  all 
obligations  of  Colombia  to  them,  and  thus  destroy  the  rights, 
privileges,  and  concessions  which  Colombia  by  the  treaty  sol- 
emnly authorized  the  canal  company  to  sell  to  the  United  States. 
That,  if  successful,  would  of  course  destroy  the  treaty  by  defeat- 
ing its  main  purpose.  This  was  one  of  many  similar  attacks,  all 
instigated  by  the  Colombian  government,  against  the  treaty 
which  its  representatives  had  signed,  conduct  which,  as  Secretary 
Hay  has  pointed  out,  is  in  violation  of  the  familiar  rule  that 
"  two  governments,  in  agreeing  to  a  treaty  through  their  duly 
authorized  representatives,  bind  themselves,  pending  its  ratifica- 
tion, not  only  not  to  oppose  its  consummation,  but  also  to  do 
nothing  in  contravention  of  its  terms."  The  attack  which  is  be- 
lieved to  have  been  the  main  cause  of  the  rejection  of  the  treaty 
by  the  Colombian  Congress  was  made  in  a  report  to  the  Colom- 
bian Senate  by  its  canal  committee,  in  which  it  was  held  that  ac 
the  end  of  a  year  all  the  concessions  granted  by  the  government 
to  the  Panama  Canal  Company  would  lapse,  and  that  then  Co- 
lombia could  take  for  itself  the  forty  million  dollars  which  the 
United  States  had  agreed  to  pay  the  Panama  Canal  Company. 
After  this  the  treaty  was  rejected  and  the  congress  adjourned. 

WHY  THE  PRESIDENT   WAS   PROMPT. 

It  is  the  contention  of  the  American  government  that  Colom- 
bia's course  in  regard  to  the  treaty  showed  conclusively  the 
hopelessness  of  ever  getting  a  satisfactory  agreement  from  her. 
That  was  the  conclusion  of  the  people  of  Panama,  for  they  made 
up  their  minds  that  in  case  the  treaty  was  rejected  they  would 
revolt,  and  they  made  elaborate  preparations,  months  in  advance 
to  do  so,  fully  anticipating  rejection. 

This  was  the  situation  when  the  revolution  took  place  on 
November  3,  1903.  President  Roosevelt  had  become  so  thor- 
oughly convinced,  when  the  treaty  was  rejected,  that  further 
efforts  to  reach  agreement  with  Colombia  on  fair  and  equitable 
terms  would  be  useless,  that  his  intention  was,  he  said  in  a  sub- 


14  PANAMA  REPUBLIC   AND   CANAL. 

sequent  message,  "  to  consult  the  congress  as  to  whether  under 
such  circumstances  it  would  not  be  proper  to  announce  that  the 
canal  was  to  be  dug  forthwith ;  that  we  would  give  the  terms 
that  we  had  offered  and  no  others;  and  that  if  such  terms  were 
not  agreed  to  we  would  enter  into  an  arrangement  with  Panama 
direct,  or  take  what  other  steps  were  needful  in  order  to  begin 
the  enterprise."  In  taking  this  position,  he  was  acting  in  ac- 
cordance with  a  sentiment  expressed  by  Secretary  Cass,  in  1858, 
in  the  following  official  statement  of  the  American  government's 
attitude : — 

"  While  the  rights  of  sovereignty  of  the  states  occupying  this  region 
(Central  America)  should  always  be  respected,  we  shall  expect  that  these 
rights  be  exercised  in  a  spirit  befitting  the  occasion,  and  the  wants  and 
circumstances  that  have  arisen.  Sovereignty  has  its  duties  as  well  as  its 
rights,  and  none  of  these  local  governments,  even  if  administered  with 
more  regard  to  the  just  demands  of  other  nations  than  they  have  been, 
would  be  permitted,  in  a  spirit  of  eastern  isolation,  to  close  the  gates  of  in- 
tercourse on  the  great  highways  of  the  world,  and  justify  the  act  by  the 
pretension  that  these  avenues  of  trade  and  travel  belong  to  them,  and  that 
they  choose  to  shut,  or,  what  is  almost  equivalent,  to  encumber  them  with 
such  unjust  relations  as  would  prevent  their  general  use." 

Forty-six  years  had  passed  since  that  opinion  was  expressed, 
and  during  that  time  no  progress  had  been  made  toward  begin- 
ning the  construction  of  the  canal.  Finally,  Colombia  had 
placed  herself  in  the  pathway  of  progress  in  precisely  the  ob- 
structive manner  which  Secretary  Cass  had  declared  would  not 
be  permitted.  This  was  the  final  provocation,  not  only  to  the 
United  States  but  to  Panama.  The  latter  rose  in  revolt  and  de- 
clared its  independence,  and  the  United  States  government  rec- 
ognized its  independent  existence  as  a  republic  immediately.  In 
justification  of  such  prompt  action,  the  Roosevelt  administration 
cited  the  condition  of  affairs  on  the  Isthums  at  the  moment. 
Panama  had  been  accumulating  material  for  war  for  several 
months.  The  Isthmus  was,  according  to  the  reports  of  trust- 
worthy authorities,  a  perfect  arsenal  and  its  people  were  deter- 
mined to  make  the  most  desperate  resistance  to  the  efforts  of 
Colombia  to  subdue  them.  That  Colombia  was  also  prepared  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  at  the  moment  when  independence  was 
proclaimed,  on  the  morning  of  November  3,  she  had  a  gunboat 
with  between  four  and  five  hundred  troops  off  Colon  on  the  way 
to  Panama.  Secretary  Hay,  in  his  reply  to  General  Reyes,  thus 
defines  the  situation : — • 

"  On  the  one  hand  stood  the  government  of  Colombia  invoking  in  the 
name  of  the  treaty  of  1846  the  aid  of  this  government  in  its  efforts  to  sup- 


PANAMA  KEPUBLIC  AND  CANAL.      15 

press  the  revolution;  on  the  other  hand  stood  the  republic  of  Panama  that 
had  come  iuto  being  in  order  that  the  great  design  of  that  treaty  might 
not  be  forever  frustrated,  but  might  be  fulfilled.  The  Isthmus  was  threat- 
ened witli  desolation  by  another  civil  war,  nor  were  the  rights  and  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States  alone  at  stake;  the  interests  of  the  whole  civil- 
ized world  were  involved.  The  republic  of  Panama  stood  for  those 
interests;  the  government  of  Colombia  opposed  them.  Compelled  to 
choose  between  these  two  alternatives,  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  in  no  wise  responsible  for  the  situation  that  had  arisen,  did  not  hesi- 
tate. It  recognized  the  independence  of  the  republic  of  Panama,  and  upon 
its  judgment  and  action  in  the  emergency  the  Powers  of  the  world  have 
set  the  seal  of  their  approval. " 

That  civil  war  would  have  begun  immediately  on  November 
3  but  for  the  intervention  of  the  United  States,  is  proved  by 
the  official  report  of  Commander  Hubbard,  of  the  United  States 
gunboat,  "  Nashville,"  who  had  been  ordered  by  the  American 
government  to  Colon  to  protect  the  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus 
along  the  line  of  the  Panama  Railway.  The  commanding  officers 
of  the  Colombian  troops  had  asked  for  transportation  over  the 
railway  to  Panama  for  their  troops  and  it  had  been  granted,  but 
it  was  prohibited  by  Commander  Hubbard  as  in  violation  of  the 
perfect  neutrality  of  the  line  of  transit  which  the  United  States 
is  bound  to  maintain.  If  Commander  Hubbard  had  not  been  on 
the  spot,  the  troops  would  have  gone  to  Panama  and  civil  war 
would  have  been  begun  on  November  fourth.  The  Colombian 
troops,  after  failing  to  get  transportation  to  Panama,  sought  to 
occupy  Colon  on  November  fifth,  in  violation  of  an  agreement 
between  their  commanding  officers  and  Commander  Hubbard. 
The  latter,  as  soon  as  he  learned  of  this  intention,  landed  his 
full  force  of  marines,  only  forty-two  in  number,  for  the  avowed 
purpose  of  protecting  the  lives  and  property  of  American  citizens 
if  threatened,  and  by  doing  this  and  maintaining  a  cool  and  firm 
attitude  in  the  presence  of  the  Colombian  troops  when  they  en- 
tered the  city,  he  prevented  bloodshed  and  the  beginning  of  civil 
war.  President  Roosevelt  said  on  this  point  in  his  message  of 
January  4,  1904 :  — 

"  Instead  of  there  having  been  too  much  prevision  by  the  American 
government  for  the  maintenance  of  order  and  the  protection  of  life  and 
property  on  the  Isthmus,  the  orders  for  the  movement  of  American  war- 
ships had  been  too  long  delayed ;  so  long,  -in  fact,  that  there  were  but 
forty -two  marines  and  sailors  available  to  land  and  protect  the  lives  of 
American  men  and  women  *  *  *  It  clearly  appears  that  the  fact  that 
there  was  no  bloodshed  on  the  Isthmus  was  directly  due, — and  only  due, 
— to  the  prompt  and  firm  enforcement  by  the  United  States  of  its  tradi- 
tional policy." 


16  PANAMA  REPUBLIC  AND  CANAL. 

If  civil  war  had  once  begun,  how  long  would  it  have  lasted, 
and  how  wide  would  its  complications  have  extended?  In  con- 
sidering this  question,  the  President  and  Secretary  Hay  had  to 
judge  the  future  in  the  light  of  the  past.  During  the  previous 
fifty-seven  years,  there  had  been  on  the  Isthmus  no  less  than 
fifty-three  revolutions,  almost  one  a  year,  some  of  them  lasting 
for  several  years,  and  a  recent  one  between  Panama  and  Colom- 
bia extending  over  three  years.  In  none  of  these  had  there  been 
such  provocation  for  revolt  as  the  rejection  of  the  treaty,  or 
such  formidable  preparations  for  resistance.  The  people  of 
Panama  were  convinced  that  their  future  as  a  community  or 
state,  financial  and  other,  depended  absolutely  upon  the  con- 
struction of  the  canal.  If  that  were  built,  a  future  of  steadily 
increasing  power  and  importance  lay  before  them.  If  it  were 
not  built  in  their  territory  it  would  be  built  in  Nicaragua,  and 
the  doom  of  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  would  be  sounded, 
for  even  the  Isthmian  Railway  would  cease  to  be  operated  and 
Panama  would  fall  into  a  speedy  and  hopeless  decline.  As  one 
of  the  leading  citizens  of  Panama  said  soon  after  the  revolution : — 

"  We  looked  upon  the  building  of  the  canal  as  a  matter  of  life  or  death 
to  us.  We  wanted  that  because  it  meant,  with  the  United  States  in  con- 
trol of  it,  peace  and  prosperity  for  us. 

"  Notwithstanding  all  that  Colombia  has  drained  us  of  in  the  way  of 
revenues,  she  did  not  bridge  for  us  a  single  river,  nor  make  a  single  road- 
way, nor  erect  a  single  college  where  our  children  could  be  educated,  nor 
do  any  thing  at  all  to  advance  our  industries. " 

Under  these  conditions,  great  provocation  followed  by  unusual 
preparations  for  resistance,  it  was  a  reasonable  supposition  that 
civil  war,  once  instituted,  would  last  for  several  years.  It  was 
the  avowed  intention  of  Colombia  to  delay  the  whole  question  of 
a  canal  for  a  year  in  order  to  get  into  position  to  claim  for  her- 
self the  forty  million  dollars  that  had  been  promised'  by  the 
United  States  to  the  Panama  Canal  Company.  If,  after  a  year 
of  conflict,  with  the  United  States  government  constantly  on 
guard  to  protect  the  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus  and  to  keep  its 
line  of  transit  open,  Colombia  had  endeavored  to  enforce  its  con- 
tention that  all  rights  and  concessions  to  the  canal  company  had 
lapsed  and  had  reverted  to  herself,  she  would  unquestionably 
have  brought  France  into  the  conflict,  for  that  government  would 
be  compelled  to  uphold  the  rights  of  its  citizens  who  were  stock- 
holders in  the  canal  company.  Under  these  circumstances,  it 
would  have  been  very  difficult  for  the  United  States  to  avoid 
being  drawn  into  the  conflict,  if  our  government  had  used  its 


PANAMA  REPUBLIC  AND  CANAL.      17 

power  to  aid  Colombia  in  suppressing  the  revolt,  or  had  refrained 
from  exerting  its  influence  in  the  direction  of  peace  by  promptly 
recognizing  the  independence  of  Panama.  It  was  a  case  of  in- 
stant recognition,  or  a  long  and  bloody  conflict,  with  possible 
international  complications.  The  Koosevelt  administration, 
called  to  decide  between  these  alternatives,  decided  for  instant 
recognition.  As  President  Roosevelt  put  it  in  his  message  of 
January  4,  1904 : — 

"  Recognition  by  this  government  was  based  upon  a  state  of  facts  in 
no  way  dependent  for  its  j  ustification  upon  our  action  in  ordinary  cases. 
I  have  not  denied,  nor  do  I  wish  to  deny,  either  the  validity  or  the  pro- 
priety of  the  general  rule  that  a  new  state  should  not  be  recognized  as  in- 
dependent till  it  has  shown  its  ability  to  maintain  its  independence.  This 
rule  is  derived  from  the  principle  of  non-intervention,  and  as  a  corollary 
of  that  principle  has  generally  been  observed  by  the  United  States.  But, 
like  the  principle  from  which  it  is  deduced,  the  rule  is  subject  to  excep- 
tions; and  there  are,  in  my  opinion,  clear  and  imperative  reasons  why  a 
departure  from  it  was  justified  and  even  required  in  the  present  instance. 
These  reasons  embrace,  first,  our  treaty  rights ;  second,  our  national  inter- 
ests and  safety;  and,  third,  the  interests  of  collective  civilization. 

"  Instead  of  using  our  forces,  as  we  were  invited  by  Colombia  to  do, 
for  the  twofold  purpose  of  defeating  our  own  rights  and  interests  and  the 
interests  of  the  civilized  world,  and  of  compelling  the  submission  of  the 
people  of  the  Isthmus  to  those  whom  they  regarded  as  oppressors,  we  shall, 
as  in  duty  bound,  keep  the  transit  open,  and  prevent  its  invasion." 

COMPLICITY  AND    TREATY  OBLIGATIONS. 

Was  there  complicity  between  the  American  government,  or 
any  of  its  representatives,  and  the  revolutionists  ? 

On  this  point  it  is  necessary  only  to  cite  the  official  utter- 
ances of  the  President  and  Secretary  Hay.  In  his  message  of 
January  4,  1904,  the  President  said : — 

"I  hesitate  to  refer  to  the  injurious  insinuations  which  have  been  made 
of  complicity  by  this  government  in  the  revolutionary  movement  in 
Panama.  They  are  as  destitute  of  foundation  as  of  propriety.  The  only 
excuse  for  my  mentioning  them  is  the  fear  lest  unthinking  persons  might 
mistake  for  acquiescence  the  silence  of  mere  self-respect.  I  think  proper 
to  say,  therefore,  that  no  one  connected  with  this  government  had  any 
part  in  preparing,  inciting,  or  encouraging  the  late  revolution  on  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  that  save  from  the  reports  of  our  military  and  naval 
officers,  given  above,  no  one  connected  with  this  government  had  any  pre- 
vious knowledge  of  the  revolution  except  such  as  was  accessible  to  any 
person  of  ordinary  intelligence  who  read  the  newspapers  and  kept  up  a 
current  acquaintance  with  public  affairs." 

In  his  reply  of  January  5  to  the  formal  statement  of  Colom- 
bia's grievances  which  General  Reyes  made  to  him  on  December 
23,  Secretary  Hay  said : — 


18      PANAMA  KEPUBLIC  AND  CANAL. 

"  The  press  in  this  country  is  entirely  free  and  as  a  necessary  conse- 
quence represents  substantially  every  phase  of  human  activity,  interest, 
and  disposition.  Not  only  is  the  course  of  the  government  in  all  matters 
subject  to  daily  comment,  but  the  motives  of  public  men  are  as  freely  dis- 
cussed as  their  acts;  and  if,  as  sometimes  happens,  criticism  proceeds  to 
the  point  of  calumny,  the  evil  is  left  to  work  its  own  cure.  Diplomatic 
representatives,  however,  are  not  supposed  to  seek  in  such  sources  mate- 
rial for  arguments,  much  less  for  grave  accusations.  Any  charge  that 
this  government,  or  any  responsible  member  of  it,  held  intercourse, 
whether  official  or  unofficial,  with  agents  of  revolution  in  Colombia,  is 
utterly  without  justification. 

"Equally  so  is  the  insinuation  that  any  action  of  this  government  prior 
to  the  revolution  in  Panama  was  the  result  of  complicity  with  the  plans 
of  the  revolutionists.  The  department  sees  fit  to  make  these  denials,  and 
it  makes  them  finally." 

Were  our  treaty  obligations  violated  in  refusing  to  aid  Colom- 
bia to  put  down  the  revolution  ? 

It  is  not  only  contended  but  proved  by  the  supporters  of  the 
government's  conduct,  that  under  the  treaty  of  1846  the  United 
States  was  bound  to  aid  Colombia  in  maintaining  her  sovereignty 
only  in  case  an  effort  were  made  to  attach  Panama  to  a  foreign 
power.  Citations  from  official  records  show  a  continuous  line  of 
interpretation  by  our  secretaries  of  state  from  1865  to  the  pres- 
ent time  in  accord  with  this  dispatch  from  Secretary  Seward  to 
the  American  minister  at  Bogota : — 

"November  9,  1865. 

"  Sm  : — The  question  which  has  recently  arisen  under  the  thirty-fifth 
article  of  the  treaty  with  New  Granada,  as  to  the  obligation  of  this  gov- 
ernment to  comply  with  a  requisition  of  the  President  of  the  United  States 
of  Colombia  for  a  force  to  protect  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  from  invasion 
by  a  body  of  insurgents  of  that  country,  has  been  submitted  to  the  consid- 
eration of  the  Attorney  -General.  His  opinion  is  that  neither  the  text  nor 
the  spirit  of  the  stipulation  in  that  article,  by  which  the  United  States 
engages  to  preserve  the  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  imposes  an 
obligation  on  this  government  to  comply  with  a  requisition  like  that  re- 
ferred to.  The  purpose  of  the  stipuation  was  to  guarantee  the  Isthmus 
against  seizure  or  invasion  by  a  foreign  power  only.  It  could  not  have 
been  contemplated  that  we  were  to  become  a  party  to  any  civil  war  in 
that  country  by  defending  the  Isthmus  against  another  party.  As  it  may 
be  presumed,  however,  that  our  object  in  entering  into  such  a  stipulation 
was  to  secure  the  freedom  of  transit  acrosss  the  Isthmus  if  that  freedom 
should  be  endangered  or  obstructed,  the  employment  of  force  on  our  part 
to  prevent  this  would  be  a  question  of  grave  expediency  to  be  determined 
by  circumstances.  The  department  is  not  aware  that  there  is  yet  occasion 
for  a  decision  upon  this  point." 

From  the  date  of  that  dispatch  to  the  present  time  this  con- 
struction has  been  imposed  upon  the  treaty  of  1846  by  every 
diplomatic  agent  and  secretary  of  state  in  the  American  govern- 


PANAMA  REPUBLIC  AND  CANAL.      19 

ment.  Furthermore,  the  Colombian  government  has  itself  ac- 
cepted the  same  construction,  for  Mr.  Burton,  in  replying  to  Sec- 
retary Seward's  dispatch  in  1865,  wrote  that  he  had  opened  up 
this  subject  of  the  construction  of  the  treaty  of  1846  with  the 
diplomatic  agents  and  ministers  of  the  Colombian  government, 
and  addeci : — 

"  The  result  has  been  that  the  Colombian  government  declares  that  it 
does  not  feel  itself  authorized  by  the  treaty  to  require  the  aid  of  the 
United  States  for  the  suppression  of  an  insurrection,  rebellion,  or  other 
disturbance  on  the  Isthmus  on  the  part  of  the  Colombian  citizens ;  not  even 
an  invasion  by  another  Colombian  state,  unless  such  movement  be  intended 
to  detach  the  state  of  Panama  from  the  Colombian  union  and  to  annex  it  to 
a  foreign  power.  This  would  seem  to  leave  the  Isthmus  free  to  declare 
itself  independent  of  the  United  States  of  Colombia,  without  the  fear  of 
the  forced  intervention  of  the  United  States  of  America,  provided  such 
declaration  be  not  accompanied  by  the  end  of  annexation  to  a  foreign 
power. " 

That  was  the  situation  in  1846,  as  interpreted  about  twenty 
years  later.  The  question  was  a  very  different  one  in  1903. 
The  railway  which  was  constructed  from  ocean  to  ocean  by 
American  capital  has  thirty-two  stations,  and  at  each  of  these 
there  is  a  group  of  population.  At  one  end  is  Colon  with  a 
population  of  fourteen  thousand,  and  at  the  other  is  Panama 
with  a  population  of  twenty  thousand.  There  are  warehouses, 
storehouses,  stations,  yards,  and  cars  and  other  property  be- 
longing to  the  railway  company  scattered  along  the  road's  length. 
In  addition  are  the  dredges  and  machinery  of  the  canal  com- 
pany, which  the  Canal  Commission  estimated  as  worth  one  mil- 
lion dollars.  The  American  government  must  consider,  when 
confronted  with  the  question  of  interrupting  transit  on  the  Isth- 
mus, not  its  obligations  merely  under  the  treaty  of  1846,  but  its 
inherent  right  to  safeguard  the  great  interests  and  right  of 
American  capital  invested  there.  When  Colombia  sought  to  use 
the  railway  in  order  to  institute  civil  war,  she  herself  violated 
the  treaty,  for  civil  war  would  have  closed  the  Isthmus  and 
made  necessary  American  intervention  to  reopen  tralfic  and  keep 
it  open. 

COLOMBIA'S   USURPING   GOVERNMENT. 

Was  there  a  constitutional  government  in  Colombia  at  the 
time  of  the  Panama  revolution  ? 

On  this  point  I  shall  follow  the  argument  of  ex- Secretary 
Root  in  his  speech  in  Chicago  on  February  23,  1904.  He  claimed 


20      PANAMA  KEPUBLIO  AND  CANAL. 

that  Panama  retained  an  independent  sovereignty  as  a  state  first 
in  the  republic  of  New  Granada  and  later  in  the  republic  of 
Colombia,  quoting  from  the  different  constitutions  of  those  con- 
federations to  show  that  for  nearly  fifty  years  Panama  "  has 
never  voluntarily  surrendered  her  sovereignty/'  When  the  new 
constitution  of  Colombia  was  adopted  in  1863,  Mr.  King,  the 
American  minister  at  Bogota,  reported  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
at  Washington  that  under  it  "  the  states  comprising  the  union 
were  vested  with  absolute  and  unqualified  sovereignty.  From 
them  emanated  all  authority,  and  without  their  assent  none  could 
be  exercised  by  the  federal  functionaries  of  the  nation."  Under 
that  constitution  Panama  lived  as  a  sovereign  state  in  coopera- 
tion with  the  other  states  of  Colombia  for  twenty-three  years. 
In  1885  Rafael  Nunez  became  president.  He  undertook  to  gov- 
ern in  disregard  of  constitutional  limitations,  and  was  resisted  in 
many  parts  of  the  republic,  including  Panama.  He  overcame 
the  resistance  and  then  declared  that  the  "constitution  of  1863 
no  longer  exists."  He  put  Panama  under  martial  law  and  ap- 
pointed a  governor  for  it  and  for  the  other  states.  He  then 
directed  these  governors  to  appoint  delegates  to  a  constitutional 
convention,  and  these  delegates  framed  the  constitution  of  1886. 
The  two  delegates  who  represented  Panama  had  never  set  foot 
in  that  state.  The  new  constitution  was  adopted  without  com- 
pliance with  a  single  one  of  the  requisites  prescribed  by  the  con- 
stitution of  1863  for  its  amendment.  It  robbed  the  people  of 
Panama  of  every  vestige  of  self-government.  It  gave  them  a 
governor  to  be  appointed  at  Bogota,  and  he  in  turn  appointed 
all  his  subordinate  administrative  officers.  The  new  constitution 
was  never  submitted  to  the  people  of  Panama  for  approval  or  re- 
jection. Mr.  Root  said  of  the  situation  at  and  subsequent  to 
this  subjugation :  "  The  people  of  Panama  fought  to  exhaustion 
in  1885  to  prevent  the  loss  of  their  liberty,  and  they  were  de- 
feated through  the  action  of  the  naval  forces  of  the  United 
S bates.  Three  times  since  then  they  have  risen  in  rebellion 
against  their  oppressors.  In  1895  they  arose  and  were  sup- 
pressed by  force ;  in  1899  they  arose  again  and  for  three  years 
maintained  a  war  for  liberation,  which  ended  in  1902  through 
the  interposition  of  the  United  States  by  armed  force.  The  ris- 
ing of  November,  1903,  was  the  fourth  attempt  of  this  people  to 
regain  the  rights  of  which  they  had  been  deprived  by  the  usur- 
pation of  Nunez." 

In  1898  M.  A.  Sanclamente  was  elected  president,  and  J.  M. 
Maroquin  vice-president,  of  the  republic  of  Colombia.     On  July 


PANAMA   REPUBLIC   AND   CANAL.  21 

31, 1900,  the  vice-president,  Maroquin,  executed  a  "coup  d'etat " 
by  seizing  the  person  of  the  president,  Sanclamente,  and  impris- 
oning him  at  a  place  a  few  miles  outside  of  Bogota.  Maroquin 
thereupon  declared  himself  possessed  of  the  executive  power  be- 
cause-of  the  absence  of  the  president.  He  then  issued  a  decree 
that  public  order  was  disturbed,  and,  upon  that  ground,  assumed 
to  himself  legislative  power  under  another  provision1  of  the  con- 
stitution. Thenceforth,  Maroquin,  without  the  aid  of  any  legis- 
lative body,,  wiled  as  the  supreme  executive,  legislative,  civil, 
and  military  authority  in  the  so-called  republic  of  Colombia. 
The-- absence  of  Sanclamente  from  the  capital  became  permanent 
by  his  death  in  prison  in  the  year  1902.  When  the  people  of 
Panama  declared  their  independence  in  November,  1903,  no  con- 
gress had  sat  in  Colombia  since  the  year  1898,  except  the  special 
congress  called  by  Maroquin  to  reject  the  canal1  treaty,  and  Which 
did  reject  it  by  a  unanimous  vote,  and  adjourned  without  legis- 
lating on  any  other  subject.  The  constitution  of  18#6  had  taken 
away  from  Panama  the  power  of  self-government  and  vested  it 
in  Colombia.  The  coup  d'etat  of  Maroquin  took  away  from  Co- 
lombia- herself  the  power  of  government  and  vested  it  in  an  irre- 
sponsible dictator. 

After  the  revolution  of  Panama}  General  Reyesr  in  behalf  of 
the  Colombian  government,  made  an  offer  to  the  American  gov- 
ernment, through  the  American  minister,  to  ratify  the  treaty, 
either  by  calling  the  congress  together  again  or  by  decree,  thus 
admitting  that  constitutional  government  did  not  exist  in  Colom- 
bia. The  question  thus  placed  before  the  government  of  the 
United  States  then  became  not  one  of  interest,  said  Mr.  Root, 
for  treaty  and  canal  were  secure,  but  a  "question  of  right,  a 
question  of  justice,  a  question  of  national  conscience."  The  peo- 
ple of 'Pan  am  a  were  the  real  owners  of  the  canal  route.  They 
had  never  parted  with  theirtitle  to  it,  but  constituted  the  federal 
government  its  trustee.  The  trustee  was  faithless  to  the  trust, 
had  repudiated  its  obligations,  and  had  seized  with  the  strong 
hand  of  military  power  the  rights  which  it  was  bound  to  protect. 
Mii.. Root's  conclusion  is  likely  to  be  that  of  the1  American  rjeo- 
pie:- 

"The  question  for  the  United  States  was,  Shall  we  take  this  treaty 
from  the  true  owner,  or  shall  we  take  it  from  the  faithless  trustee,  and  for 
that  purpose  a  third  time  put  back  the  yoke  of  foreign  domination  upon 
the  neck  of  Panama  by  the  request  of  that  government  which  has  tried  to 
plajr  toward  us  the  part  of  the  highwayman?  By  all  the  principles  of 
justice  among  men  and  among  nations  that  we  have  learned  from  our 
fathers,  and  all  peoples  and  all  governments  should  maintain,  the  revolu- 


22      PANAMA  REPUBLIC  AND  CANAL. 

tionists  in  Panama  were  right,  the  people  of  Panama  were  entitled  to  be 
free  again,  the  Isthmus  was  theirs,  and  they  were  entitled  to  govern  it, 
and  it  would  have  been  a  shameful  thing  for  the  government  of  the  United 
States  to  return  them  again  to  servitude. " 

Was  the  act  of  recognition  justified  by  the  interests  of  civili- 
zation ? 

President  Roosevelt  firmly  believed  it  was.  He  said  in  his 
message  of  January  4,  1904 :  "  I  confidently  maintain  that  the 
recognition  of  the  republic  of  Panama  was  an  act  justified  by  the 
interests  of  collective  civilization.  If  ever  a  government  could 
be  said  to  have  received  a  mandate  from  civilization  to  effect  an 
object  the  accomplishment  of  which  was  demanded  in  the  inter- 
est of  mankind,  the  United  States  holds  that  position  with  regard 
to  the  inter-oceanic  canal."  The  civilized  world  very  promptly 
confirmed  this  view  of  our  position  as  the  mandatory  of  civiliza- 
tion when  through  fifteen  of  its  governments,  including  those  of 
the  leading  nations,  it  recognized  the  independence  of  the  new 
republic.  Putting  all  other  considerations  aside,  it  is  easy  to 
discern  that  the  great  force  which  moved  not  only  the  United 
States  government  but  the  governments  of  the  civilized  world  as 
a  body  forward  so  unanimously  in  this  matter,  was  self-interest 
in  three  forms.  First,  the  self-interest  of  Panama,  which  com- 
pelled the  revolution  as  the  only  method  of  escape  from  destruc- 
tion. Seccond,  self-interest  of  the  United  States,  which  demands 
a  canal  for  its  commerce  and  the  development  of  its  resources. 
Third,  self-interest  of  civilization  throughout  the  world.  On 
this  point, — that  an  isthmian  oanal  free  to  the  commerce  of  the 
world  is  an  inestimable  boon  to  all  mankind, — there  is  no  dis- 
senting voice.  By  rejecting  the  new  treaty,  for  the  reasons 
given  and  in  the  mannar  followed,  Colombia  put  herself  athwart 
the  pathway  of  the  progress  of  the  world,  and  the  world  united 
to  brush  her  aside.  Then,  too,  there  was  that  sympathy  with 
Panama  which  always  goes  forth  to  a  people  striving  to  rid  them- 
selves of  oppression.  As  Vattel  says:  "  When  a  people  for  good 
reasons  take  up  arms  against  an  oppressor,  it  is  but  an  act  of 
justice  and  generosity  to  assist  brave  men  in  the  defence  of  their 
liberties." 


OUR   WORK   AS   A   CIVILIZER. 

I  REMEMBER  hearing  an  astute  observer,  who  had  made  a 
lifelong  study  of  American  politics  and  character,  say,  after 
the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  "  Well,  that  starts 
u«i  as  a  nation  on  a  new  and  disastrous  career.  We  are  to  go 
into  the  business  of  colonization,  and  no  people  were  ever  more 
utterly- unfit  for  such  work  than  we  are.  Our  colonial  adminis- 
tration will  be  saturated  with  spoils  politics  and  be  directed  by 
spoils  politicians.  We  shall  make  a  dreadful  mess- of  it,  .dis- 
gracing ourselves  in  the  eyes  of  the  civilized  world."  Never  did 
prediction  fail  more  completely  of  fulfillment  than  this  has 
failed.  Precisely  the  opposite  has  happened.  We  have  shown 
that  we  are  exceptionally  fit  for  the  work  of  colonization,  we 
have  kept  spoils  politics  and  spoils  politicians  out  of  the  work 
entirely,  and  we  have  honored  ourselves  in  the  eyes  of  the  world 
by  the  way  in  which  we  have  performed  it.  For  this  highly 
creditable  achievement  the  nation  is  indebted  primarily  to  Presi- 
dent McKinley.  He  made  it  not  only  possible  but  certain  when 
he  selected  as  pioneers  in  this  new  field  of  American  endeavor 
such  men  as  Generals  Ludlow  and  Wood  for  Cuba,  Judge  Taft 
for  the  Philippines,  and  Mr.  Allen  for  Porto  Rico.  Of  each  of 
these  men  it  can  be  said,  as  President  Roosevelt  said  so  finely  of 
General  Wood  in  his  Harvard  commencement  address  in  1902, 
"  credit  to  him !  Yes,  in  a  way.  In  another  no  particular  credit, 
because  he  was  built  so  that  he  could  do  nothing  else."  If  Presi- 
dent McKinley  had  done  his  country  no  other  service  than  to 
select  these  men  for  this  new  task  he  would  have  earned  the  last- 
ing gratitude  of  the  American  people,  for  it  was  a  service  that 
not  only  brought  honor  to  his  country,  but  advanced  the  cause  of 
civilization  throughout  the  world.  This  is  not  panegyric,  but 
the  simple  language  of  fact,  as  a  plain  statement  of  what  these 
men  have  done  within  three  years  will  demonstrate. 

THE   NEW  REPUBLIC   OF   CUBA. 

The  story  of  what  was  done  in  Cuba,  before  it  was  turned 
over  to  its  people  for  self-government,  reads  like  a  romance. 
General  Wood,  in  his  admirable  account  of  his  work  in  the  island, 

23 


24  OUR    WORK   AS   A   CIVILIZER. 

which  he  gave  before  the  Williams  College  alumni  in  1902,  said 
that  the  only  instructions  which  President  McKinley  gave  him 
when  he  asked  him  to  go  to  Cuba  were :  "  I  want  you  to  go  down 
there  to  get  the  people  ready  for  a  republican  form  of  government, 
I  leave  the  details  of  procedure  to  you.  Give  them  a  good 
school  system ;  try  to  straighten  out  their  courts,  and  put  them  on 
their  feet  as  best  you  can.  We  want  to  do  all  we  can  for  them, 
and  we  want  to  get  ready  to  get  out  of  the  island  as  soon  as  we 
can  safely  do  so."  Could  the  work  of  helping  a  people,  just  re- 
lieved from  centuries  of  oppression,  to  start  forward  in  the  path 
of  civilization  have  been  outlined  more  simply  or  more  wisely  or 
more  magnanimously  than  that  ?  General  Wood  carried  out  his 
instructions  in  the  spirit  in  which  they  were  given,  and  the  bare 
account  of  what  he  succeeded  in  doing  reads  like  a  tale  from  the 
"Arabian  Nights";  like  a  summary  of  results  achieved  through 
the  use  of  an  Aladdin's  lamp  or  of  a  magic  wand.  He  found 
the  island  without  a  government,  without  either  a  school  or  a 
court  system  worthy  of  the  name,  and  in  a  condition  of  filth 
which  made  the  cities  of  Havana  and  Santiago  the  most  unhealthy 
in  the  world.  Within  less  than  four  years  later,  he  left  the 
island  with  an  established  form  of  republican  government,  under 
a  constitution  modeled  closely  upon  that  of  the  United  States, 
with  a  comprehensive,  intelligent,  and  upright  court  system, 
with  a  public  school  system  that  extended  through  all  the  prov- 
inces, and  with  a  system  of  sanitation  that  had  made  the  cities 
as  healthy  as  any  in  the  world,  and  had  freed  the  island  from 
contagious  diseases,  including  yellow  fever,  for  the  first  time  in 
its  history.  When  Santiago  surrendered,  its  condition  from  a 
sanitary  point  of  view  was  beyond  description.  Its  death-rate 
was  300  a  day  in  a  population  of  40,000.  In  one  province  there 
were  3,000  cases  of  smallpox,  and  in  one  hospital  1,200  victims. 
When  General  Wood  left  Cuba,  less  than  four  years  later,  the 
death-rate  was  on  a  line  with  that  of  New  England,  and  the 
cities  of  Havana  and  Santiago  had  a  cleaner  bill  of  health  than 
the  city  of  Washington.  Millions  of  dollars  had  been  spent  in 
the  work  of  sanitation,  and  the  incalculably  valuable  discovery 
had  been  made  of  the  variety  of  mosquito  that  transmitted  the 
germs  of  yellow  fever.  As  far  back  as  1881  an  old  Cuban  physi- 
cian, Dr.  Finlay,  advanced- the  theory  that  yellow  fever  is  trans- 
mitted by  mosquitoes,  but  never  found  the  particular  variety  of 
mosquito  that  produced  the  infection.  After  the  American  gov- 
ernment began  the  reconstruction  of  Cuba,  different  methods 
were  tried  for  the  extermination  of  yellow  fever.  First  came 


OUR   WORK  AS  A  CIVILIZEK.  25 

the  experiments  with  corrosive  sublimate,  then  the  successful 
campaigns  against  the  mosquito.  The  yellow  fever  commission 
was  formed,  which  made  heroes  of  its  three  members  and  a  mar- 
tyr of  one,  The  discovery  that  yellow  fever  cannot  be  trans- 
mitted by  contact,  but  by  the  sting  of  a  mosquito,  General  Wood 
says,  was  worth  the  whole  cost  of  the  war,  and  is  the  most  im- 
portant discovery  in  medical  science  since  that  of  vaccination. 

In  his  work  of  establishing  a  school  system  General  Wood 
proceeded  with  equal  energy  and  good  judgment.  He  found  al- 
most enough  prisons,  military  hospitals,  and  barracks  in  Cuba 
to  make  schoolhouses  for  the  people.  He  found  only  one  uni- 
versity on  the  island,  and  in  each  province  a  single  institute  or 
high  school  having  many  professors  and  few  students.  The  pub- 
lic school  was  unknown.  When  he  left  Cuba  there  were  3,786 
schools,  with  4,000  teachers,  and  the  yearly  enrolment  of  pupils 
was  252,000,  with  a  daily  attendance  of  140,000.  Of  the  total 
revenue  $4,200,000,  or  twenty-tive  per  cent.,  was  spent  for  educa- 
tional purposes.  General  Wood  believes  in  the  large  school, 
and  what  he  says  of  the  one  which  he  established  in  the  old  and 
indescribably  filthy  military  barracks  in  Havana,  shows  what  a 
genuine  missionary  spirit  animated  him  in  this  field  of  his  colo- 
nizing work:  "We  spent  a  great  deal  of  money  on  this  building 
in  the  plumbing  and  in  all  kinds  of  up-to-date  sanitary  arrange- 
ments. We  spent  it  because  I  believe  that  a  big  school  like  that, 
in  the  center  of  a  city  of  300,000  people,  most  of  whom  are 
ignorant  of  the  very  principles  of  sanitation,  with  every  sanitary 
improvement  put  into  the  building,  will  be  much  more  valuable 
than  any  books  we  can  give  to  the  children.  For  this  is  an  ob- 
ject lesson,  and  in  going  back  to  their  homes  the  children  will 
make  demands  for  improved  sanitary  conditions."  The  Ohio 
school  law  was  put  into  Spanish  and  adopted,  and  has  been  very 
successful,  and  to-day  there  is  a  uniform  school  system  through- 
out the  island  of  Cuba. 

When,  on  May  20,  1902,  General  Wood  tamed  the  island 
over  to  President  Palm  a  and  the  new  government,  Cuba  was  free 
from  debt  and  had  a  more  promising  political  future  than  was 
enjoyed  by  any  other  Latin-American  community.  The  people 
had  received  during  these  few  years  of  American  control  an  ob- 
jcet  lesson  in  government  that  was  of  the  highest  value.  They 
had  seen  the  transformation  made  from  mediaeval  barbarism  to 
modern  civilization,  and  had  acquired  an  elementary  knowledge 
at  least  of  the  fundamental  principles  and  methods  of  civilized 
government.  They  had  seen  that  government  established  first 


26  OU&   WORK   AS   A  CIVILIZER. 

in  the  municipalities,  then  extended  to  the  provinces,  then  em- 
bodied and  formulated  in  a  constitution  for  a  republic.  Many 
of  them  as  members  of  municipal  bodies,  or  as  municipal  offi- 
cials, had  acquired  practical  knowledge  of  the  operation  of  gov- 
ernment. We  had,  in  short,  done  our  full  duty  in  starting  them 
on  the  road  that  President  McKinley  marked  out  in  his  instruc- 
tions to  General  Wood. 

PEACE   AND  PROGRESS   IN   THE   PHILIPPINES. 

What  has  been  accomplished  in  the  Philippines  is,  when  the 
immensely  greater  obstacles  encountered  are  considered,  fully  as 
notable  as  the  result  achieved  in  Cuba.  There  was  no  insurrec- 
tion in  Cuba,  no  opposition  to  American  control,  and  the  work 
of  amelioration  began  immediately  upon  American  possession. 
In  the  Philippines  an  organized  insurrection  began  with  the  first 
moment  of  American  possession  and  continued  with  varying  de- 
grees of  activity  for  more  than  three  years.  During  most  of  that 
time  the  islands  were  under  military  rule,  and  whatever  civil 
government  there  was  was  merely  a  branch  of  the  military.  The 
military  government  called  into  requisition  the  services  of  mili- 
tary officers  by  detailing  them  to  civil  duties.  Till  July,  1901, 
the  commanding  general  of  the  army  in  the  islands  was  civil  ex- 
ecutive as  well.  Under  his  direction,  and  working  in  harmony 
with  him,  the  Taft  Commission  began  to  lay  the  foundations  of 
civil  rule,  seeking  to  place  them  firm  and  enduring  in  the  princi- 
ples of  popular  government.  Slow  but  sure  progress  was  made 
in  this  work,  one  province  after  another  passing  under  control 
of  civil  rule,  with  a  government  in  which  their  own  leading  men 
took  a  greater  or  less  part  according  to  varying  local  conditions, 
until  in  July  of  the  present  year  the  entire  archipelago  passed 
under  civil  rule,  with  Judge  Taft  as  governor,  and  military  rule 
was  withdrawn.  The  islands  were  then  at  peace  with  the  United 
States  throughout  their  entire  extent,  and  have  remained  so  since. 
In  a  communication  which  he  sent  to  the  Senate  at  that  time, 
Secretary  Root  gave  the  total  amount  expended  by  the  American 
government  in  the  islands  as  about  $170,000,000,  and  said  of 
the  military  forces :  "  In  the  middle  of  the  fiscal  year  ending 
June  20,  1901,  there  were  about  70,000  American  soldiers  in  the 
island.  That  number  is  now  reduced  to  about  23,000.  Orders 
have  now  been  issued  for  the  return  of  the  Eighth,  Fifteenth, 
Twenty-fourth,  and  Twenty-fifth  Infantry  and  a  squadron  of  the 
Tenth  Cavalry,  and  when  these  orders  have  been  executed  the 


OUR   WORK   AS   A  CIVILIZER.  27 

number  of  American  troops  in  the  Philippines  will  have  been  re- 
duced to  18,000." 

The  bare  recital  of  the  results  achieved  by  the  Taft  Commis- 
sion up  to  the  time  of  the  establishment  of  supreme  civil  govern- 
ment is  a  really  marvellous  story.  Provincial  governments  had 
been  established  in  nearly  all  the  provinces  and  municipal  gov- 
ernments in  nearly  all  the  larger  towns.  A  civil  service  law  had 
been  enacted,  and  for  several  years  had  been  working  admirably, 
which  is  a  stricter  application  of  the  merit  system  than  any  simi- 
lar law  in  the  United  States.  Four  million  dollars  had  been 
appropriated  for  harbor  and  road  improvements.  A  public  school 
system,  with  1,000  American  teachers  and  2,500  Filipino  teach- 
ers, had  been  established  and  schools  had  been  opened  in  500  of 
the  900  towns  in  the  island.  In  addition  normal  and  manual 
training  schools  had  been  organized.  There  had  been  established 
a  judiciary  system,  with  a  supreme  court  made  up  of  three 
American  and  four  Filipino  judges,  with  appellate  jurisdiction, 
and  fifteen  judicial  district  courts  with  general,  civil,  and  crimi- 
nal jurisdiction.  A  local  police  and  insular  constabulary  force 
had  been  organized  with  5,000  men,  about  150  in  each  province, 
under  inspectors  partly  American  and  partly  Filipino,  of  which 
Governor  Taft  said  in  May  last :  "  I  am  glad  to  say  that  thus  far 
the  operation  of  the  constabulary  system,  has  been  most  satisfac- 
tory, and  ladronism  (brigandage)  is  rapidly  disappearing.  The 
selection  of  men  for  its  ranks  has  been  very  carefully  made. 
The  system  of  selecting  only  residents  of  the  province  for  serv- 
ice in  the  province  avoids  the  danger  of  abuse  and  looting  by  the 
members  of  the  constabulary  themselves.  In  a  force  of  some 
5,000  men  there  have  been  reported  but  few  desertions.  The 
constabulary  costs  the  Philippine  government  $250  a  man  yearly, 
on  the  average."  There  had  also  been  established  a  Health  De- 
partment, cooperating  with  local  health  officials  in  all  parts  of 
the  island,  an  Agricultural  Bureau,  Bureau  of  Mining,  Bureau  of 
Ethnology,  a  Bureau  of  Forestry,  and  a  Postal  System.  Thus 
far  the  government  had  been  self-supporting,  its  income  being 
mostly  from  customs  receipts.  Surely  this  is  a  record  of  prog- 
ress in  less  than  two  years  which  is  a  striking  tribute  to  Gov- 
ernor Taft's  ability  as  an  administrator  and  to  American  capac- 
ity in  the  work  of  civilization  and  colonization.  When  it  is 
added  that  on  July  4,  1903,  a  proclamation  was  issued  granting 
amnesty  to  all  Filipino  prisoners,  including  Aguinaldo,  and  that 
no  outbreak  of  any  kind  has  followed  to  disturb  the  peace  of  the 
islands,  the  record  of  pacification  is  seen  to  be  complete,  thus 


28  OUR   WORK   AS   A  CIVtUZER, 

opening  the  way  to  a  rapid  continuance  of  the  civilizing  work  al- 
ready so  well  begun. 

In  this  genuine  service  to  civilization  Governor  Taft  was  the 
leading  force,  the  dominating  influence,  as  distinctly  as  was  Gen- 
eral Wood  in  Cuba.  President  Roosevelt's  estimate  of  his  char- 
acter and  work,  in  his  speech  at  Harvard,  was  ;as  just  as  it  was 
eloquent  and  generous.  It  has  been  my  inestimable  privilege  to 
enjoy  intimate  personal  friendship  with  Governor  Taft  since  his 
appointment  to  the  Philippines  by  President  McKinley  in  the 
spring  of  1900.  I  had  many  long  talks  with  him  on  the  eve  of 
his  departure  to  the  islands,  and  there  was  perceptible  in  him 
then  the  awakening  of  that  genuine  missionary  spirit  which  after- 
wards took  complete  possession  of  him.  He  told  me  then  that 
he  had  been  against  the  war  with  Spain,  had  believed  it  to  be  an 
unnecessary  war,  and  regretted  that  it  had  left  us  with  the 
Philippines  on  our  hands.  But  the  Treaty  of  Paris  closed  that 
part  of  the  case.  All  there  was  for  every  American  to  do  after 
that  was  to  help  his  country  to  solve  the  new  problems  which 
the  war  had  left  on  its  hands.  When  President  McKinley  asked 
him  to  aid  in  this  task,  he  felt  that  he  had  no  right  to  refuse. 
He  resigned  his  seat  on  the  bench  of  the  United  States  Circuit 
Court,  although  his  tastes  and  ambition  impelled  him  to  a  judi- 
cial career,  and  accepted  the  call  of  his  country.  I  talked  with 
him  freely  about  his  plans,  and  as  I  look  back  over  his  work  in 
the  islands  I  can  see  few  or  no  really  important  particulars  in 
which  he  has  departed  from  them.  His  intellectual  grasp, of  the 
problem  had  been  so  strong,  his  foresight  so  clear,  that  he  was 
able  to  map  out  his  work  in  all  its  largest  details  before  he  had 
started  for  the  scene.  This  was  especially  the  case  in  regard  to 
the  lands  held  by  the  friars,  for  the  solution  which  he  had  in 
mind  then  is  the  one  which  he  has  brought  to  success  now,  and 
which  he  presented  with  such  ability  and  tact  at  Rome  as  to 
command  both  the  confidence  and  win  the. approval  of  the  Pope 
and  the  authorities  of  the  Catholic  Church. 

What  the  President  said  of  him  was  based  on. personal  knowl- 
edge of  all  this  and  of  >  much  more  of  the  same  character.  lie 
said  he  had,  during  Governor  Taft's  visit  to  this  country,  said  to 
him  that  he  was  aware  of  his  ambition  to  become  a  justice  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  but  that  if  a  vacancy  were  to  occur  then  he  did 
not  see  how  he  could  possibly  give  it  to  him  because  the  country 
needed  him  where  he  was ;  and  that  to  this  Governor  Taft  re- 
plied: "  Mr.  President,  it  has  always  been  my  dream  to  be  in  the 
Supreme  Court  j  but  if  you  should  offer  me  a  justiceship  now 


OUR   WORK  AS  A  CIVILIZER.  29 

and  at  the  same  time  Congress  should  take  off  entirely  my  salary 
as  governor,  I  should  go  straight  back  to  the  Philippines  never- 
theless; for  these  people  need  me  and  expect  me  back  and  be- 
lieve I  won't  desert  them."  Every  one  who  met  Governor  Taft 
during  that  visit  found  him  imbued  with  this  spirit  and  concurred 
heartily  with  the  estimate  which  the  President  made  of  him  after 
his  return:  "He  has  gone  back,  gone  as  a  strong  friend  among 
weaker  friends  to  help  them  upward  along  the  stony  and  difficult 
path  of  self-government;  to  do  his  part,  and  a  great  part,  in 
making  the  American  name  a  symbol  of  honor  and  of  good  faith 
in  the  Philippine  Islands;  to  govern  with  justice  and  with  that 
firmness,  that  absence  of  weakness,  which  is  only  another  side  of 
justice.  He  has  gone  back  to  do  all  that  because  it  is  his  duty 
as  he  sees  it.  We  are  to  be  congratulated,  we  Americans,  that 
we  have  a  fellow  American  like  Taft." 

THE   FRIARS'    LANDS. 

In  no  part  of  his  great  task  in  the  Philippines  has  Governor 
Taft  displayed  higher  ability  than  in  that  relating  to  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  lands  held  by  the  friars.  He  realized  at  the  start 
that  this  was  the  crucial  element  in  the  problem,  for  unless  the 
friars  could  be  banished  permanently  from  the  islands  there 
could  be  little  real  progress  made  in  the  direction  of  pacifica- 
tion and  improvement.  The  one  subject  upon  which  all  the 
Filipinos  were  united  was  that  of  hostility  to  the  friars. 
This  was  based  upon  the  political  power  which  the  friars  ex- 
ercised for  fifty  years  previous  to  the  battle  of  Manila  Bay. 
As  Governor  Taft  put  it:  "The  friars  were  the  policemen  of 
Spain.  They  exercised  absolute  power  in  every  municipality 
within  their  respective  parishes,  and  they  were  made  responsible 
by  the  people  for  every  act  of  oppression,  individual  or  general, 
which  might  be  charged  to  the  Spanish  government."  While 
the  Filipinos  of  these  parishes  were  Catholics  and  devoted  to 
their  Church,  they  would  not  tolerate  these  representatives  of 
the  Church  any  longer  among  them.  The  last  insurrection 
against  Spain,  shortly  before  the  battle  of  Manila,  was  caused 
largely  by  hatred  of  the  friars,  50  of  whom  were  killed  in  it, 
and  300  of  whom  were  prisoners  when  the  Americans  took  pos- 
session of  Manila  and  released  them.  They  owned  in  various 
provinces  about  420,000  acres  of  land,  some  of  which  they  had 
greatly  improved  by  irrigation  and  other  processes.  After  the 
insurrection,  or  for  four  years  or  more,  the  friars  were  unable  to 


30  OUR   WORK   AS   A  CIVILIZER. 

collect  any  rents  from  the  people  occupying  the  lands,  but  under 
the  Treaty  of  Paris  they  were  lawful  owners  of  the  lands,  were 
entitled  to  the  use  of  them  and  the  fruits  of  them,  and  if  they 
were  allowed  to  return  and  seek  to  enforce  the  rights  of  owner- 
ship the  certain  result  would  be  riot  and  insurrection.  What 
Governor  Taft  proposed  was  the  purchase  of  the  lands  from  them 
by  the  United  States  government  and  their  sale  in  small  hold- 
ings to  the  present  tenants,  on  long  and  easy  payments,  the  gov- 
ernment to  issue  bonds  in  an  amount  sufficient  for  the  purchase, 
and  the  proceeds  of  sales  to  go  into  a  sinking  fund  for  the  re- 
demption of  the  bonds.  Congress  authorized  this  proceeding, 
and  in  December,  1903,  all  the  lands  were  bought  for  $7,239,- 
000,  with  the  exception  of  about  10,000  acres  that  had  been  sold 
to  a  railway  company.  About  three-fifths  of  the  lands  purchased 
are  highly  cultivated  and  thickly  inhabited  by  thousands  of  ten- 
ants. In  his  final  report  as  Civil  Governor,  previous  to  leaving 
the  islands  to  assume  the  duties  of  Secretary  of  War  at  Wash- 
ington, Mr.  Taft  said,  in  speaking  of  this  transaction :  "  It  is  not 
thought  that  the  income  from  the  islands  for  several  years  will 
be  enough  to  meet  the  actual  outgo,  but  with  a  restoration  of 
normal  conditions — speaking  for  myself  alone — I  hope  that  the 
lands  will  sell  for  as  much  as  we  have  paid  for  them.  Other 
members  of  the  Commission  do  not  think  so.  It  is  to  be  noted, 
however,  that  the  insular  government  has  not  entered  upon  the 
purchase  of  these  lands  with  a  view  to  a  profitable  investment, 
but  that  it  is  knowingly  paying  a  considerable  sum  of  money 
merely  for  the  purpose  of  ridding  the  administration  of  the  gov- 
ernment in  the  islands  of  an  issue  dangerous  to  the  peace  and 
prosperity  of  the  people  of  the  islands. 

"  Following  the  policy  which  it  was  announced  by  the  Vatican 
would  be  pursued,  the  bishops  who  were  Spanish  friars  in  all  the 
dioceses  of  the  islands  have  been  allowed  to  resign  and  their 
places  have  been  filled  by  American  Catholic  bishops.  I  cannot 
state  with  too  much  emphasis  the  satisfaction  I  feel  in  this 
change.  It  means,  in  my  judgment,  the  beginning  of  a  new  era 
in  the  islands.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  a  large  part  of  the  peo- 
ple of  the  islands  will  continue  to  be  communicants  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church,  and  it  cannot  but  have  a  liberalizing  effect 
upon  them  that  their  bishops  shall  be  Americans  with  American 
ideas  of  a  separation  of  church  and  state,  and  with  the  American 
respect  for  individual  rights  and  individual  liberties." 

It  may  be  well,  in  order  to  complete  the  record,  to  cite  what 
President  McKinley  said  to  Judge  Taft,  when  he  selected  him 


OUR   WORK   AS   A   CIVILIZER.  31 

to  go  to  the  Philippines.  It  is  very  like  in  tone  and  temper  to 
what  he  said  to  General  Wood.  In  his  speech  at  a  banquet 
which  was  given  in  his  honor  by  his  fellow  citizens  of  Cincinnati, 
after  his  appointment,  Judge  Taf t  said :  "  The  high  and  patriotic 
purpose  of  the  President  in  the  present  juncture  is  to  give  to  the 
people  of  the  Philippine  Islands  the  best  civil  government  which 
he  can  provide,  with  the  largest  measure  of  self-government  con- 
sistent with  stability.  He  seeks  only  the  welfare  of  the  Filipino 
and  the  betterment  of  his  condition."  Speaking  for  him  at  the 
same  time,  Judge  Taft  said :  "  The  problems  seem  certainly  for- 
midable enough.  It  will  take  patience,  persistence,  and  tact  to 
work  them  out.  Doubtless  we  shall  make  mistakes  which  will 
deserve  criticism,  but  if  we  maintain  our  purpose  steadfast,  to  do 
nothing  save  for  the  good  of  the  Filipino  people,  we  hope,  in 
spite  of  their  formidable  character,  to  surmount  the  obstacles 
and  win  success.  If  we  can  thus  relieve  a  hitherto  unfortunate 
and  oppressed  people  from  the  evil  of  three  centuries  of  misgov- 
ernment  the  end  will  be  worth  the  struggle."  In  his  formal  in- 
structions to  the  Taft  Commission,  President  McKinley  said: 
"  A  high  and  sacred  obligation  rests  upon  the  government  of  the 
United  States  to  give  protection  for  property  and  life,  civil  and 
religious  freedom,  and  wise,  firm,  and  unselfish  guidance  in  the 
paths  of  peace  and  prosperity  to  all  the  people  of  the  Philippine 
Islands.  I  charge  this  commission  to  labor  for  the  full  perform- 
ance of  this  obligation,  which  concerns  the  honor  and  conscience 
of  their  country." 

A  few  months  later,  in  his  letter  accepting  a  renomination, 
President  McKinley  said :  "  It  is  our  purpose  to  establish  in  the 
Philippines  a  government  suitable  to  the  wants  and  conditions  of 
the  inhabitants,  and  to  prepare  them  for  self-government,  and 
to  give  them  self-government  when  they  are  ready  for  it,  and  as 
rapidly  as  they  are  ready  for  it."  It  is  because  these  instruc- 
tions have  been  carried  forward  in  letter  and  in  spirit  that  the 
work  which  we  are  doing  in  the  Philippines  is  a  great  service  to 
the  civilization  of  the  world. 


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